Global College of PME Select Distance Learning Course Examples-IDE

Courses Preview for:

WAR-601S - Warfare Studies

ISS-601S - National Security & Strategic Competition

ISS-602A – Making Decisions

Strategy and Security Studies Suite: Intermediate Professional Military Education

- Courses are self-paced and facilitated.
- Two self-paced courses prepare the student for a final facilitated course in the strategy and security studies suite (SSS suite).
- These courses and readings prepare students for a "capstone" facilitated course in the SSS suite.
- Other courses at IDE level include Leadership and Joint Airpower and Warfare Studies courses. These consist of self-paced and facilitated courses.
- **<u>These excerpts are designed to demonstrate the outline for courseware in the Global College.</u>**

All IDE Courses

- Three functional areas/departments:
  - Strategy and Security Studies (in this presentation)
  - Joint Airpower and Warfare Studies
  - Leadership

WAR 601S-Warfare Studies

Course Description

The *Warfare Studies* (WS) course introduces students to the canon of military theory, focusing on issues such as the nature of war, the levels of war, the range of military operations, military strategy, and operational art. This course specifically examines not only traditional forms of warfare but also guerrilla, insurgency, counterinsurgency, and other forms of warfare. Students will apply the lessons of military theory and their understanding of warfare to operational challenges facing today's and tomorrow's United States military.

Course Learning Outcomes

After completing the course, students should be able to:

1. Elaborate on the connections between the fundamental characteristics of warfare, military theories, and historical precedents and their implications for effectively employing the military instrument of power (IOP) across the range of military operations. (Understanding)

2. Analyze traditional and alternative forms of warfare and competition, considering various perspectives and aspects. (Analyzing)

3. Employ insights from military theory, historical practice, and existing U.S. security and military directives to contextualize and navigate the complexities of modern strategic competition. (Applying)

ISS-601S - National Security & Strategic Competition

Course Description

Renewed competition among international great powers is progressively shaping America's national security landscape. As states vie for greater influence on the international stage, they shape US security strategies, policies, and interests. In this course, students will learn how to effectively interpret (a) the 21st century's dynamic security environment by exploring the theoretical and historical underpinnings of strategic competition, (b) the tools of national security, and (c) key geographic and domain flashpoints animating contemporary competition.

Course Learning Outcomes

After completing the course, students should be able to:

1. Explain the factors that inform US national security decision making in the context of strategic competition. (Understanding)

2. Interpret the utility and limitations of IR theory in the context of strategic competition. (Applying)

3. Interpret the utility and limitations of international history for understanding strategic competition. (Applying)

ISS-602A – Making Decisions

Course Description

There is a complicated interdependency among the schools of international relations (IR), the use of instruments of power, and the implications of warfare theories in American policy, strategy, and the complex interactions of international relations. Students will gain the ability to compare and contrast schools of International Relations and instruments of power to more effectively analyze American security challenges. This course provides an in-depth exploration of the complexity involved with developing and executing national strategy. Students are afforded an opportunity to integrate course outcomes from ISS-601S *National Security and Strategic Competition* and WAR-601S *Warfare Studies*. In this course, students will use their foundational knowledge of national security and warfare studies to analyze a real-world crisis affecting international relations and global security.

Course Learning Outcomes

After completing the course, students should be able to:

1. Analyze the utility and limitations of IR theory in the context of strategic competition. (Analyzing)
2. Apply an ends-ways-means-risk approach to strategic competition with the People's Republic of China. (Applying)

WAR-601S - Warfare Studies

Warfare Studies

Course Syllabus
GET STARTED

LESSON 1
LESSON 2
LESSON 3
LESSON 4
LESSON 5
Course Wrap-Up

WARFARE STUDIES

Lesson 1 - The Nature of War

Click to Begin Lesson

Lesson 1 - The Nature of War

This lesson addresses war as a concept along with its unchanging nature through the eyes of Clausewitz. Though the nature of war is unchanging, the character and conduct of war do change. This section explores this unchanging nature, its complexity, and how military thinkers have interacted with that complexity while waging war.

Contents

Introduction

The Complexities of War

The Levels of War

The Interactions of the Levels

Course Syllabus

▼ Syllabus

Course Syllabus

Course Description

The *Warfare Studies* course introduces students to the canon of military theory, focusing on the fundamental concepts of war, such as the nature of war, the levels of war, military strategy, operational art, and just war theory. Beyond the traditional study of warfare in its conventional form, this course examines alternative forms of warfare such as guerilla warfare, insurgency, counterinsurgency, hybrid threats, and terrorism. Through this study, students will be prepared to apply the lessons of military theory and their understanding of warfare to the operational challenges facing the US military in the present and the future.

Course Learning Outcomes

After completing the course, students should be able to:

1. Explain the changing nature of war. (Understanding)
2. Interpret the utility and limitations of military theory in the context of strategic competition. (Applying)
3. Interpret the utility and limitations of military history in the context of strategic competition. (Applying)

Michael Walzer on Just War Theory | Bi...

Watch on ▶ YouTube

Michael Walzer on Just War Theory | Big Think (2011) 5 MINUTES

REQUIRED MATERIAL

On War (1989 translation)

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ
ON WAR
Edited and Translated by
MICHAEL HOWARD and PETER PARET

The Art of War (1963 translation)

SUN TZU
THE
ART OF WAR

THE COMPLEXITIES OF WAR

"The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike him as hard as you can, and keep moving on."

– Ulysses S. Grant

"In war events of importance are the result of trivial causes."

– Julius Caesar

When warfare theorists first approached their subject, they identified an initial need to be reductive - to offer a straightforward answer for what this practice was and why mankind engaged in it. The answers classical theorists came up with were remarkably similar across time and space. The classic military thinker **Sun Tzu**, tackling the subject from ancient China during a period of turbulence and state-building, approached warfare as "of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin." Two thousand years later, **Carl von Clausewitz**, often viewed as the pre-eminent Western observer of the nature of war, echoed those words of his predecessor, claiming that "war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means." To this day, current United States doctrine builds off of these forebears, noting war itself is an instrument of policy, and victory in war cannot be defined by casualties or destruction, but by the survival of the state and the achievement of policy objectives.

While these answers certainly tell scholars, policymakers, and warfighters why they are engaging in war, they only scratch the surface of war and its practice. From this simple starting point, the subject of war and warfighting takes on an extraordinary complexity, with this complex nature remaining essentially timeless even as the character of wars and conflicts change.

Clausewitz explored this complex nature throughout his magisterial work *Vom Krieg*, or *On War*. In it, Clausewitz conceptualizes war as a contest between two opponents, a duel on a massive scale to impel an opponent to do our will. Required to achieve effects on this scale, though, is the coordinated effort of a multitude of individual human contests and achievements. At its heart, although war is a contest, it is invariably also a fundamentally human endeavor. This helps to define the unchanging nature of the conflict - as the aggregate expression of human nature itself is unchanging.

Given that ultimately warfare is a human endeavor, Clausewitz in turn identifies key characteristics of war as products of its human nature. Underpinning all military

Lesson Overview

This lesson addresses the various forms that conventional war takes, from seeking decisive battle to longer campaigns of attrition. Along with these topics, it also explores the concept of the Operational Art and the debate around the existence of an "American Way of War."

Lesson Objectives

WARFARE STUDIES

Lesson 2 - Conventional War

Click to Begin Lesson

INTRODUCTION

(1) Surrender of Lord Cornwallis (1781)   (2) Raising the Flag at Iwo Jima (1945)

(3) M-1 Abrams Tanks in Baghdad (2011)

Conventional War

Conventional Warfare, sometimes called Traditional Warfare in doctrine, is the form of warfare that occurs between the formal and legitimate militaries of two states or coalitions of states. Given that these states have formal militaries

Following the terrible campaigns of attrition forced by the scale of conflict on the Western Front during the First World War, military thinkers tried to conceptualize a method to "rediscover" decisive battle. Interwar thinkers like **Heinz Guderian**, **Erwin Rommel**, **JFC Fuller**, and **BH Liddell Hart** struggled to conceive a new pattern of conflict based upon successful late-war innovations like storm-trooper tactics, tanks, and airpower. These thinkers pushed for greater integration of these new tactics and technologies to avoid the battering campaigns of attrition, even as they re-opened avenues for maneuvers and decisive strikes.

These newly conceived concepts initially found their purchase with the German Wehrmacht, whose shocking victories against Poland and France in 1939-1940 introduced the world to the integration of combined arms tactical actions intended to seamlessly and flexibly serve the German strategic goals. As the war drew more combatants into its grip and increased in scale, these German innovations found their way into Soviet and American military thinking, driving the formation of what would be known as the **Operational Art**. Since then, the Operational Art has remained a cornerstone of American military thinking, driving such military concepts as **AirLand Battle** and the wildly successful drive on Baghdad in 2003.

Lesson 2 - Conventional War

This lesson addresses the various forms that conventional war takes, from seeking decisive battle to longer campaigns of attrition. Along with these topics, it also explores the concept of the Operational Art and the debate around the existence of an "American Way of War."

Contents

DECISIVE BATTLE VS. ATTRITION

"In this manner Fabius, having given the people better heart for the future, by making them believe that the gods took their side, for his own part placed his whole confidence in himself, believing that the gods bestowed victory and good fortune by the instrumentality of valour and of prudence; and thus prepared he set forth to oppose Hannibal, not with intention to fight him, but with the purpose of wearing out and wasting the vigour of his arms by lapse of time, of meeting his want of resources by superior means, by large numbers the smallness of his forces."

- Plutarch (philosopher, 46-120 AD), on Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus Cunctator

The study of warfare, especially the study of it in the Western World, has often divided the methods of warfare pursued into two categories. The first is warfare focused on the creation of a decisive battle that will crush the enemy's means or will to resist, thus forcing the cessation of the armed struggle and likely gaining the political objectives of the war. This has taken on many names, including Decisive Battle and Wars of Annihilation, and it has generally become synonymous with what is sometimes called a "Western Way of War." Most of the exalted generals through history have been practitioners of this method of war, from **Hannibal** and his nemesis **Scipio Africanus** to Napoleon Bonaparte to **George S. Patton**.

THE AMERICAN WAY

"All real Americans love the sting and clash of battle. When you were kids, you all admired the champion marble shooter, the fastest runner, the big-league ball players and the toughest boxers. Americans love a winner and will not tolerate a loser. Americans play to win all the time. That's why Americans have never lost and will never lose a war. The very thought of losing is hateful to Americans. Battle is the most significant competition in which a man can indulge."

- George S. Patton (Commander of the US Third Army and Seventh Army, 1885-1945)

"War is a terrible thing! You mistake, too, the people of the North. They are a peaceable people but an earnest people, and they will fight, too. They are not going to let this country be destroyed without a mighty effort to save it … Besides, where are your men and appliances of war to contend against them? The North can make a steam engine, locomotive, or railway car; hardly a yard of cloth or pair of shoes can you make. You are rushing into war with one of the most powerful, ingeniously mechanical, and determined people on Earth - right at your doors."

Lesson Overview

This lesson offers a contrast to Lesson 2, delving into the various forms of irregular warfare that modern combatants can engage in. Beyond the classic concepts of Insurgency and Counter Insurgency, this lesson also offers introductions to the practice of terrorism and the increasingly common waging of hybrid conflicts.

Lesson Objectives

In this lesson, students will:

1. Describe key concepts of asymmetric forms of warfare, such as insurgency, guerrilla warfare, hybrid threats, and terrorism, and the challenges they pose to US military operations. (Understanding)
2. Describe the key theories and principles of counterinsurgency. (Understanding)

Lesson 3 - Irregular War

This lesson offers a contrast to Lesson 2, delving into the various forms of irregular warfare that modern combatants can engage in. Beyond the classic concepts of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, this lesson also offers introductions to the practice of terrorism and the increasingly common waging of hybrid conflicts.

Contents

Introduction

Guerrilla Warfare and Insurgency

Terrorism

Gray Zone Warfare

Conclusion

TERRORISM

"It is necessary to distinguish clearly between sabotage, a revolutionary and highly effective method of warfare, and terrorism, a measure that is generally ineffective and indiscriminate in its results, since it often makes victims of innocent people and destroys a large number of lives that would be valuable to the revolution."

- Ernesto 'Che' Guevara (Argentine Marxist revolutionary, 1928-1967)

REQUIRED VIDEOS

In the two provided video excerpts below, James Kiras discusses the definition of terrorism, why terrorists think they will succeed, the purpose of terrorism, and the trends and implications for the future. Given Kiras' discussion, can terrorism be considered a form of warfare? Can it have decisive effects? How so?

eSchool of Graduate PME, "Kiras, Terrorism as a Weapon of War" (2017). Watch all of Excerpt 1.

TO LEARN MORE

Howard, "Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, Readings and Interpretation" (2011)

Howard and Hoffman's book offers an excellent overview of the issues involved in both terrorism and countering that phenomena. The book is filled with multiple chapters that explore the myriad of forms that modern terrorism takes, why it is pursued, and how it might be countered.

NOTE: This resource is not available in the course. Visit your local library or bookseller.

GRAY ZONE WARFARE

Five Gross Reef, 2015

One of the more recent discussions in terms of irregular warfare has been the concept of "Gray Zone Warfare" or "Hybrid Warfare." These debates have been largely driven by the interventions of Russia and China into regions where they are attempting to assert influence and authority. China's expansion into the South China Sea has involved several confrontations with regional rivals but has not seen general warfare break out. Russia's intervention in the Ukraine, while generally acknowledged by observers, has not been officially declared. As such, these conflicts end up falling into an anomalous category where they are not war but also not peace. Competition and confrontations occur across the spectrum of instruments of power but rarely or never involve formal combat at all. As such, they form a challenge to the international order, since these efforts tend to stand outside most conventional efforts to dissuade or defeat them.

GUERRILLA WARFARE AND INSURGENCY

"Guerrilla warfare has qualities and objectives peculiar to itself. It is a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation"

- Mao Tse-Tung (Chinese Communist leader, 1893-1976)

"The guerrilla band is not to be considered inferior to the army against which it fights simply because it is inferior in firepower. Guerrilla warfare is used by the side which is supported by a majority, but which possesses a much smaller number of arms for use in defense against oppression."

- Ernesto 'Che' Guevara (Argentine Marxist revolutionary, 1928-1967)

"What is the crux of the problem for the counterinsurgent? It is not how to clean an area. We have seen that he can always concentrate enough forces to do it, even if he has to take some risk in order to achieve the necessary concentration. The problem is, how to keep an area clean so that the counterinsurgent forces will be free to operate elsewhere."

- David Galula (French military officer, 1919 -1967)

(1) George Washington (1732-1799) successfully led the American insurgency's military operations.

(2) Che Guevara (1928-1967) Rose to Prominence as a Leader of the Cuban Revolution.

(3) Mao Tse-Tung (1893-1976) Successfully Led Chinese Communist forces in 1949

Revolutionary Fighters

Source: Wikimedia Commons

Guerrilla warfare has existed for millennia under a variety of names. Small wars, raiding wars, revolutionary wars, the skulking way of war, and insurgencies all have been descriptors for this form of military action. It was guerrillas that frustrated Alexander the Great to no end in the Bactrian provinces. It was the guerrilla that gave Napoleon his "Spanish Ulcer" and gave a new title to the activity. It was the guerrilla that allowed the Chinese communists to drive away their Nationalist rivals following World War II. It was the guerrilla that emerged as the hero of the developing world during the Cold War. And recently it has been the guerrilla that has proven a deadly adversary for the United States and its allies in the War on Terror.

REQUIRED MATERIALS

Guevara, "Guerrilla Strategy and Guerilla Tactics" (1961). Read chapter 1, subsections 2-3.

In this excerpt from his classic manual on guerrilla warfare, Ernesto "Che" Guevara offers a quick overview of the strategies and tactics pursued by guerrillas in the Cuban Revolution.

Points to Ponder:

Given these excerpts, could you conceptualize an operational level of guerrilla warfare? Is Che's concept of guerrilla warfare more driven by decisive struggle or attrition?

Cohen, "Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency" (2006). Read pages 49-53.

This article provides short, simple principles and guidelines for military members regarding counterinsurgency. As the authors note, "in many ways conducting COIN operations is counterintuitive to the traditional American approach to war and combat operations."

Points to Ponder:

Is their argument convincing? Why or why not?

LESSON 4

Lesson Overview

Lesson 4 examines how wars are ended, how peace is kept, and how stability is maintained in fragile spaces. This lesson also completes the students' examination of Just War Theory, introducing the newer concept of *jus post bellum*.

Lesson Objectives

In this lesson, the student will:

1. Describe the key concepts and issues involving conflict resolution and war termination. (Understanding)
2. Describe the challenges of translating military victory into successfully achieving political objectives in the post-conflict/stability phase. (Understanding)

Lesson 4 - War Termination and Stability

Lesson 4 draws this course to a close, completing the students' work with an examination of how wars are ended, how peace is kept, and how stability is maintained in fragile spaces. This lesson also completes the students' examination of Just War Theory, introducing the newer concept of jus post bellum.

Contents

Introduction

War Termination

Conflict Resolution and Stability

Jus Post Bellum

Conclusion

CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND STABILITY

"The ballot is stronger than the bullet."

- Abraham Lincoln (16th President of the United States of America, 1809-1865)

Conflict resolution may be generally defined as a process of attempting to resolve, or settle, the root causes of conflict between various parties. It may occur in many settings ranging from settling quarrels among neighbors, to reconciling ethnic hatreds in a society, to establishing peaceful relations between two warring states. Military members will often become involved in conflict resolution when a military victory has created an environment wherein the parties involved have terminated their military conflict and now prefer the process of conflict resolution over continuing the conflict. The military may also support "conflict prevention" activities in a crisis situation in order to forestall the outbreak of actual hostilities. In either case, the military conducts stability activities primarily to provide a secure environment for enduring conflict resolution to take place. Resolving the conflict, however, also requires the civilian sector to lead in rebuilding - or even creating - indigenous law enforcement capabilities, judicial systems, and governmental institutions. Effective conflict resolution necessitates the construction or repair of both the infrastructure and the private enterprise sector, whose production will be the engine of sustainable growth and stability. Conflict resolution is particularly challenging for the United States, because it requires time and an integrated whole-of-government approach.

The figure below represents the weight of effort that are prescribed for the various activities undertaken during a joint combat operation. While reviewing this model, consider the following:

- Given what you have just read, does this model seem accurate to you?
- How does the weight of effort behind enabling and stabilizing activities compare with those of other activities?
- How might this weighting concept impact our abilities to successfully achieve the cessation of conflict?

WAR TERMINATION

A United Nations Peacekeeper Standing Watch on the Streets of Sarajevo in 1995.

Source: Wikimedia Commons

Stability activities often come once formal conflict has ended. These activities often prove far more challenging than offensive elements of an operation. There are a multitude of complexities involved in successfully stabilizing a region where, due to war, stability has likely long been absent. This often proves exceptionally challenging for members of the United States armed forces, because these operations call for them to take on roles outside the purely military realm. According to JP 3-0, the term *stability activities* encompasses "various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the US in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and to provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief" (p. V-2).

Wars may end in total victory, whereby an opponent is completely devoid of the means to resist and is subject to a peace of the victors' making. Yet such instances are rare. More often, the belligerents retain some military capacity to the end. The use of force is, therefore, aimed at altering the opposing side's decision-making calculus and affecting its sense of costs and benefits of continuing to fight. This bargaining process is often capped by a formal ending of military operations in a political instrument, such as an armistice and/or peace treaty. War termination marks the end of one state of affairs, the end of violence, and a transition to "peace" and normal international relations.

JUS POST BELLUM

"In War: Resolution. In Defeat: Defiance. In Victory: Magnanimity. In Peace: Good Will."

- Winston Churchill (Former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 1874-1965)

(1) These Yank Airmen Beam Broadly as they Look Out from their Bomber.

(2) Brother and Sister in the Street of Qala-i-Shada, Kabul.

Jus Post Bellum.

Finally, it is important to remember that there is also always a human and moral element involved in warfare, even at its termination. While the pursuit of war in a just fashion is important during its duration, for a successful conclusion to the war and to avoid the recurrence of conflict, all stakeholders must consider the moral and ethical dimensions of the peace being negotiated.

While the potential aftermath of a war is to be considered in the decision to go to war as part of the *jus ad bellum* tenet of just war theory, the post-conflict phase of war has generally been neglected by the just war theorists. However, it is garnering more attention over the last couple of decades.

REQUIRED MATERIALS

Williams, "Jus Post Bellum: Just War Theory and the Principles of Just Peace" (2006). Read pages 309-320.

This article examines the insufficiently studied concept of *jus post bellum*. The authors seek to help develop a set of jus post bellum principles.

Lesson Overview

Lesson 5 culminates the course by examining the emergent domains of space and cyberspace, along with development of threats in more traditional domains. It poses issues and challenges arising from capabilities not well established, along with law, policy, and strategy—or the absence thereof—that would cover such capabilities or new domains of warfare.

Lesson Objectives

In this lesson, the student will:

1. Explain the increasing importance of the space domain and the challenges it presents to traditional views of warfare. (Understanding)
2. Describe the issues and challenges created by the emergence of the cyberspace domain as a critical facet of competition. (Understanding)
3. Describe the implications new developments will have upon future conventional warfare. (Understanding)

WARFARE STUDIES

Lesson 5 - Future Challenges in Warfare

Click to Begin Lesson

Lesson 5 - Future Challenges in Warfare

Lesson 5 culminates the course by examining the emergent domains of space and cyberspace, along with development of threats in more traditional domains. It poses issues and challenges arising from capabilities not well established, along with law, policy, and strategy—or the absence thereof—that would cover such capabilities or new domains of warfare.

Contents

Introduction

Space and Warfare

Cyberspace and Warfare

Conclusion

SPACE AND WARFARE

"The National Space Strategy protects our vital interest in space—to ensure unfettered access to, and freedom to operate in space, in order to advance America's security, economic prosperity, and knowledge."

- National Space Strategy Fact Sheet, 2018

That the domain of space is of vital national interest to the U.S. has been asserted for decades, and other spacefaring nations worldwide have attached similar importance to space. That space is a *warfighting* domain, as distinct from a sanctuary solely for exploration and human flourishing, is a much more recent emphasis by US leadership in particular, and it is fair to say that views on the matter vary greatly. In fact, no direct combat (of any significance) has occurred in, through, or from space to date; however, weapons to conduct such combat are already fielded, and certainly space capabilities have directly supported and enhanced terrestrial warfare for quite some time. All this has meant a reconsideration of the character of warfare in light of a new, technology-driven domain.

Key issues to consider regarding space and its relation to warfare (not an exclusive list) include:

- The vitality and scope of nations' interests in space
- National space policy and strategy
- International and domestic law that applies to space
- Treaties that inform or constrain activities in space
- How military theory involving space or spacepower might be developed

REQUIRED MATERIALS

White House, "President Donald J. Trump is Unveiling an America First National Space Strategy" (2018). Read All.

This unclassified summary highlights the main points in the rewritten National Space Strategy. It emphasizes space as a vital US national interest, and outlines transformational efforts to underpin a whole-of-government approach to safeguard that interest.

Points to Ponder:

Which of the four "pillars" identified in the document seem to you to carry the greatest challenges? Why? When the document asserts this is a "new direction for U.S. space," how would you describe what is new about it?

Bruno, "Finding Baghdadi: Why Protecting Space Assets is Vital to National Security" (2019). Read all.

This article springboards from space capabilities' use in targeting Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi to underscoring the vitality of orbital assets to all of American life. It then surveys potential adversaries' efforts to be able to nullify those assets.

Points to Ponder:

In your view, does envisioning space as a warfighting domain (or even "a potential battlefield") serve US national interests well or poorly? Why? How would you describe the reasoning behind the author's assertion that "our space assets play increasingly vital roles in keeping us safe"?

CYBERSPACE AND WARFARE

"If we were to score cyber the way we score soccer, the tally would be 462-456 twenty minutes into the game, i.e. all offense."

- Chris Inglis, former Deputy Director of the National Security Agency

Advances in technology and our growing dependence upon them have led to the creation of a completely new domain: cyberspace. When strategists have confronted the emergence of a new domain, they have often looked toward past strategies in other domains. For example, airpower theorists adapted several concepts from sea power theorists. Above, you read about a spacepower theory framework adapted from the maritime domain. In regards to the cyber domain, some have advocated adopting the concept of nuclear deterrence. The cyber domain offers the particular challenge of delineating what sort of cyber attack constitutes an "act of war," and what responses are appropriate in light of Just War Theory.

TO LEARN MORE

Chesney, "The 2018 Cyber Strategy: Understanding 'Defense Forward' in Light of the NDAA and PPD-20 Changes" (2018).

This article further explores the strategy's "defend forward" line of effort, examining implications for key legislation and a presidential policy directive.

Weinstein, "The Pentagons New Cyber Strategy: Defend Forward" (2018).

The author highlights a key term from the 2018 DoD Cyber Strategy—"defend forward"—that has generated significant attention. He examines what it may mean, implications for DoD operations, and resulting strategy considerations.

Points to Ponder:

Do you agree with the author about the ramifications of a "defend forward" cyber strategy? Why or why not? What "prickly questions," other than the ones he posits, can you discern with this strategy?

REQUIRED MATERIALS

McKenzie, "Is Cyber Deterrence Possible?" (2017). Read pages 1-13.

This research paper examines whether deterrence to protect friendly information networks is possible, and how such deterrence differs from other domains of warfare. It discusses likely varying levels of cyber deterrence based upon the group in question, and outlines the framework for an effective deterrence strategy.

Points to Ponder:

What differences, if any, do you see between cyber deterrence and deterrence in other domains? Why? How would you define a "cyber attack," and why? Do you agree with the author about the lack of credibility in current cyber strategy? Is this being addressed currently, or not?

Tropeano, "Deterrence in Cyber, Cyber in Deterrence" (2019). Read all.

This article examines how the 2018 National Cyber Strategy "shifted" to put its lines of effort in the context of the National Defense Strategy published that year. The author points out areas of alignment with OPLANs, emerging opportunities for cyber to be impactful (e.g. infrastructure), and even center of gravity analysis.

Points to Ponder:

The McKenzie and Tropeano articles paint two different pictures of cyber deterrence: one lacking credibility (pre-2018 National Cyber Strategy), another (post-2018 National Cyber Strategy) having greater credibility due to its fit with the NDS. In your view, which picture is most compelling? Why?

DoD, *Summary: Department of Defense Cyber Strategy 2018* (2018). Read pages 1-7.

GCPME Distance Learning Warfare Studies Canvas course:
1. Students can easily track course progress by accessing modules page.
2. Incorporate tools such as "Yellow Dig" to facilitate course material discussion; helping students connect and have meaningful conversations about course material.
3. Rubrics easily accessible providing students valuable information and criteria for grading assignments

ISS-601S - National Security & Strategic *Competition*

GCPME Distance Learning National Security and Strategic Competition Canvas course:

1. Course syllabus provides summary of course learning objectives.
2. "Resource List" contains all the course material; providing students repository with all course material.
3. Export course content available in every course for offline course access.

2023 AU Open Enrollment

ISS-601S National Security and Strategic Competition

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National Security and Strategic Competition

Course Syllabus — GET STARTED
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Course Wrap-Up

Recent Announcements

Announcement from the Course Director Re: Perusall
Many students have contacted me to advise that the Collabo...

Posted on:
Feb 21, 2024, 7:49 AM

Posted on:
Dec 6, 2023, 12:36 PM

Posted on:
Nov 16, 2023, 7:26 AM

Course Syllabus

▼ Syllabus

Course Description

Renewed competition among international great powers is progressively shaping America's national security landscape. As states vie for greater influence on the international stage, they shape US security strategies, policies, and interests. In this course, students will learn how to effectively interpret (a) the 21st century's dynamic security environment by exploring the theoretical and historical underpinnings of strategic competition, (b) the tools of national security, and (c) key geograp... and domain flashpoints animating contemporary co...

Course Learning Outcomes

After completing the course, students should be able to:

1. Explain the factors that inform US national security decision mak... context of strategic competition. (Understanding)
2. Interpret the utility and limitations of IR theory in the context of st... competition. (Applying)
3. Interpret the utility and limitations of international history for und... strategic competition. (Applying)

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▶ Resources

▼ Resources

Resources

RESOURCE LIST

The Resource List is for reference only: It identifies all required materials for the course in the order presented. Where possible, full-text documents are linked to provide additional context outside of the course presentation. Documents accessed via the library may require a database password to view. Some materials may not be available outside of the course and are marked as such. **Students should only use this list for reference, not as an instructional guide.** Instead, use the in-course instructional narrative as the primary avenue to review materials for each lesson.

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LESSON 1

Lesson Overview

Strategic competition, while currently on the rise, is not new in the domain of international relations. In this lesson, students will explore historical examples and theoretical explanations of strategic competition to better understand the context of contemporary security challenges.

Lesson Objectives

In this lesson, students will:

1. Identify the peer and near-peer strategic threats to the United States. (Understanding)
2. Recognize the characteristics and examples of great powers. (Understanding)
3. Identify the characteristics of states and the international states system. (Understanding)
4. Distinguish between mainstream and critical International Relations theories. (Understanding)
5. Explain the nature and purpose of International Relations theories. (Understanding)
6. Explain the development and significance of realist theories for understanding strategic competition.

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Lesson Overview

LESSON 1

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5. Explain the nature and purpose of International Relations theories. (Understanding)
6. Explain the development and significance of realist theories for understanding strategic competition. (Understanding)
7. Explain the development and significance of liberal theories for understanding strategic competition. (Understanding)
8. Explain the development and significance of power transition theories for understanding strategic competition. (Understanding)
9. Recognize how great powers interact cooperatively and non-cooperatively within the international system. (Understanding)
10. Recognize how nuclear proliferation and deterrence have influenced strategic competition. (Understanding)

Lesson 1 - Sources and Outcomes of Strategic Competition

Strategic competition, while currently on the rise, is not new in the domain of international relations. In this lesson, students will explore historical examples and theoretical explanations of strategic competition to better understand the context of contemporary security challenges.

Contents

THE GREAT POWERS

Great powers are states that have the ability and the will to project their power throughout the international system. While power and its projection are difficult to objectively measure, there are arguably five widely recognized great powers today. These include the five permanent members, or the so-called "P-5", of the United Nations Security Council: the United States, China, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom. These states' claim to great power status is not merely their formal seat on the UN Security Council, but rather their historic willingness to exert their influence globally, backed by significant economic and military capabilities.

Great Powers (2020) ⏱ 7 MINUTES

Great and Global Powers

In this course, the term **great power** refers to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. We refer to today's **strategic competition** as the sometimes cooperative, but often contentious, relationship between China, Russia, and the countries of the US-led **NATO alliance**.

In addition to the term *great power*, we use **global power** to refer to a state with the preponderance of global influence in any given period. (Alternatively, some scholars use the term *global hegemon* to describe a global power.) In the current era, the global power is the United States. In the nineteenth century, the height of the British Empire, it was Great Britain.

Are there any other great powers? One could argue that Germany and Japan are also great powers, because of their considerable economic influence and military power. However, these former Axis powers have strict constitutional and social limitations on their use of coercive force, a consequence of their defeat in World War II. Thus, few consider Germany and Japan as contemporary great powers. Arguments could also be made in favor of including other states with significant military and economic strength, especially India and Brazil.

As discussed later in this lesson, the term *global power* comes from power transition theory and other similar frameworks. George Modelski defined global powers as those that are "capable of acting, and those disposed to act, in all parts of the world, habitually deploying forces of global reach. Their actions and reactions define the state of politics at the global level" (Modelski 1987, 9). Next,

The meaning of the term "power" varies between academic disciplines. In the field of International Relations, power is usually conceptualized as the ability to make an actor do what they otherwise would not do. This interpretation of power draws attention to the ways in which states use power in their relations with other actors, which is explained in the coercion continuum. According to this view, power is related to the resources that states may leverage to entice, persuade, or coerce other actors to do something they otherwise might not do.

One way to measure state power is the Global Power Index (GPI), which the National Intelligence Council originally developed, and the RAND Corporation recently modified. The **modified GPI** accounts for military expenditures, nuclear warheads, GDP, trade totals, research and development expenditures, government revenues, and working age population.

In the realm of strategic competition soft power matters because it is a way to persuade other states and non-state actors to give support to one's own position, perhaps at the expense of strategic rivals whose soft power is less persuasive. Joseph S. Nye Jr. has suggested that "The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)." (Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004, p.11) China, Russia, and the United States have all suffered damage to their soft power during the period since Nye first articulated the concept. This can be demonstrated by a brief comparison of the political dimension in the soft power model. China is criticized for its human rights record, which reflects the crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong, the repression of its Uighur minority (which might actually rise to the level of genocide), and the restriction on domestic reporting

What is Power? (2016) ⏱ 9 MINUTES

Initial Estimate of National Power

Accurately assessing a state's power is complicated. Some of the components of state power can be effectively quantified. These include the size of the state's population, the extent of its territory, the wealth of its economy, and the size and capabilities of its armed forces. Other components of state power are far more difficult to quantify, such as the extent of national unity and morale, the coherence of the state's governmental system, the quality of political leadership, and its reputation for military prowess. These tangible and intangible components of state power must be considered together. For example, a strong economy may not be decisive if the state's armed forces are ill-prepared for war. Similarly, a large army may be irrelevant if the armed forces have no will to fight, or if the apparatus of decision making is paralyzed by dysfunction.

It is important to recognize that these tangible and intangible components of state power are not absolute measures. In other words, power is situational and relational. For example, during the Second World War, the United States played a decisive role in defeating the advanced industrial states of Germany, Italy, and Japan. Yet, in the 1960s and 1970s, the United States was unable to defeat the peasant state of North Vietnam. More recently, the United States and its allies fought for two decades in Afghanistan, but despite their wealth, military skill, and technological superiority they failed to eliminate the Taliban, which swiftly took control of the country after the United States decided to withdraw in 2021.

Clearly, assessment of national power is very complex. Yet many scholars, politicians, and media commentators still attempt to distill national power down to tangible factors like military capabilities and economic wealth. This approach is unsophisticated, but its simplicity provides a starting point for assessing relative power between states

Click on the **icon below** to learn more about the military power of the United States, Russia, and China using data from Global Firepower, a website that tracks defense-related information. Economic power will be briefly addressed later in the lesson. Then, share your thoughts in the **survey to the right** and compare them to your peers' responses.

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Why do great powers cooperate or compete? To answer this question, we must first establish the basics of the **international system**, and how the distribution of power between states affects the likelihood of conflict.

States and the International System

A system refers to a collection of polities (organized societies) that regularly interact with one another on the basis of one or more commonalities. In the eighteenth century, the Enlightenment thinker Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote that: "The powers of Europe constitute a kind of system, united by the same religion, international law and moral standards, by letters, by commerce and by a kind of equilibrium which is the inevitable outcome of all these ties. And although the rulers of individual states always act to extend their dominions, the balance still remains." (Project for Perpetual Peace, 1761).

The contemporary international states system is partly a result of the process of globalization. This is often portrayed as a relatively recent phenomenon, but it has lengthy antecedents that stretch back to ancient history, as evidenced by the contacts between the Roman Empire and Han China in the first century BC. Over the next two millennia, technological innovations gradually annihilated the distance between peoples

What Is a State?

The term "state" is commonly used interchangeably with "country" or "nation". However, those terms tend to carry cultural connotations that are not helpful in the context of this course. For example, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is multinational: it contains within it "nations" of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. The United Kingdom allows some measure of political autonomy to its constituent nations (through a process called devolution), but in the context of the international states system, the United Kingdom operates as a unitary state.

STRATEGIC COMPETITION THROUGH A THEORETICAL LENS

The academic discipline of International Relations (IR) is a relatively young field of inquiry. The emergence of the discipline is usually associated with the noble purpose of trying to understand the conditions under which great powers go to war, in the hope that catastrophes such as World War I and World War II can be avoided.

There are various schools of thought in International Relations, and many ways to articulate the divisions between them. This section introduces three broad categories of rationalist international relations theories: **realism, liberalism, and power transition theory** (the latter is sometimes associated with realism, but there are significant differences that distinguish power transition theory.)

Realism and liberalism (both of which have different variants) are sometimes referred to as mainstream perspectives. There are other important and globally prominent paradigms that are critical of these approaches, including Marxism, poststructuralism, feminism, ecologism, and constructivism.

However, for the purposes of this course, we will assume that the rationalist explanations derived from realism, liberalism, and power transition theory are sufficient to help us explain the drivers behind strategic competition. Additionally, these theories help frame our understanding of general challenges that the United States faces, echoing the language and outlook of many US policymakers.

What Does It Mean to Be Rational?

In IR theories **rationality** refers to the precept that guides actors to pursue their self-interests, and use logical decision-making processes to develop policies. Because of this, a rationalist perspective never assumes that a state will engage in purposefully self-destructive behavior. A rationalist would claim that, all things being equal, one should assume self-interest is the driver of behavior at the state level, even if that behavior appears to be ideologically motivated, or even erratic, on the surface.

Keep in mind that being rational is not the same as always making good decisions. States often make mistakes or act on incomplete information, even if their process for arriving at a decision follows some form of logic. Indeed, such decisions often illustrate what economists term "bounded rationality"

Required Material

Between Theory and Practice (2020)

Wild Blue Yonder

Between Theory and Practice: The Utility of International Relations Theory to the Military Practitioner

Which Theory is Best?

Students sometimes ask: "Which IR theory is best?" This question often generates answers that students find unsatisfactory, but they are true nonetheless. It should be obvious from the content of this lesson that there has never been any agreement about the "proper" theoretical orientation of the IR discipline. As Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater note: "the early consensus about the nature of the discipline (which was always incomplete) had been replaced by a broad spectrum of contending approaches, a condition that survives to this day." (Burchill & Linklater, *Theories of International Relations*. 3rd ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 11)

The theoretical pluralism of the IR discipline is captured in the following flow chart, which is predicated on key questions that inform each of the theories:

Source: Shaoshuang Wen, POLI 330 International Organization (2020)

THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THEORY

What is Theory and Why Do We Need It?

Theory is a type of abstract thinking that is used to explain, interpret, or evaluate an object of study. In this course the broad object of study is the relationship between states, and the particular object of study is strategic competition between the United States and other great powers. Academic theories fall into categories, which reflect their purpose:

International Relations in Theory and Practice
(2017) (13 MINUTES)

Guttieri, International Relati...

- **Explanatory theory** is sometimes called descriptive, or empirical theory. This is a positivist approach, based on empirical evidence, which means that what is happening or has happened can be described accurately. The empirical evidence is derived from case studies and data sets. This approach is common to mainstream IR theories like realism and liberalism.
- **Interpretive theory** is sometimes called constitutive theory. This is a relativist approach, which suggests that there are multiple interpretations of how and why actors behave in international relations. This is common to critical IR theories, especially constructivism.
- **Normative theory** is sometimes called prescriptive theory. This is an approach that is based on values and prescribes how things should be rather than how they are. This is common to critical IR theories like green politics, or feminist politics, which suggest a guide to political action.

The Development of Theory in International Relations

The academic field of International Relations has always been theoretical in its orientation, developing through a series of "great debates".

- **The first "great debate"** (1930s-1950s) was between liberal internationalists like U.S. President Woodrow Wilson (who focused on the possibilities for peaceful cooperation) and realists like E. H. Carr (who emphasized the constancy of conflict and power politics in international relations). By the 1950s realism was the dominant school of thought, exemplified in the work of Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (first published, 1948).
- **The second "great debate"** (1960s) was between behavioralists and traditionalists. Behavioralists like Morton Kaplan argued that IR (and political science more broadly) should develop by adopting the methods of the natural sciences, whereas traditionalists like Hedley Bull contended that interpretation based on historical case studies should be the proper focus of the discipline.
- **The third "great debate"** (1970s) is also known as the "inter-paradigm debate". This was between the mainstream theories of realism and liberalism on the one hand, and Marxism on the other.
- **The fourth "great debate"** (since the 1980s) is between positivists (who believe in an objective reality that can be described, explained, and evaluated) and post-positivists (who emphasize subjectivity as a barrier to positivism). This debate reflects the importance of newer theoretical perspectives such as constructivism, postcolonialism, feminism and green politics.

To Learn More

The End of International Relations Theory? (2013)

The end of International Relations theory?

REALISM

The Intellectual Heritage of Realism

Realism is founded on a basic proposition that states act in pursuit of their self-interests, rather than in accordance with ideological or moral concerns. Realists claim a long intellectual heritage that begins with Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* (fifth century BC), which is explored further in the required material for this section. The realist lineage continues with famous works of the early modern period by Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince* (written 1513, published 1532) and Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (1651). It would be anachronistic to describe these authors as realists because the theory of realism was not articulated until the twentieth century. Nevertheless, realists look to these historical works because they contain explanations and prescriptions about the nature of international relations that are constant over time.

Theory in Action: Realism (2011) ⏱ 4 MINUTES

For example, *The Prince* is often used to exemplify a cold, calculated, approach to policy, which is encapsulated in the widely-known phrase: "the ends justify the means." This is often taken on its face to suggest that realism is amoral, but this is a common misunderstanding. Machiavelli wrote that a good ruler should be moral, but must also know when to act in defiance of moral imperatives in order to protect the people of the state. At its core, realism is concerned with the pursuit of safety and security. A realist policy therefore often seeks to avoid or limit conflict, even if that requires aligning with unsavory states or sacrificing moral imperatives. In other words, realists pursue the greater good, or the national interest, which is the *higher* imperative.

Key Tenets of Realism

Realism makes certain assumptions about the world, among them:

👤 Roll over the tabs to view more information.

States are egotistical	Classical realists (like Hans J. Morgenthau) believe that human nature is essentially selfish and competitive, the corollary of which is that states behave in the same way, and this frequently leads to conflict.
The World is anarchic	
States are unitary actors	**Realism and the Balance of Power**
States are rational	Classical realists and neorealists believe that conflict can be contained by the balance of power, although these two sub-traditions treat this concept differently. Classical realists view it as a product of prudent statecraft, whereas neorealists suggest that it is a consequence of the structural dynamics in the international system, (in other words, the way in which power is distributed between states). Early realist scholarship on the balance of power was based on examples from nineteenth-century Europe. For example, Henry Kissinger, who was a professor at Harvard before he went on to serve in government as National Security Adviser and Secretary of State, wrote *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822* (1957).

One of the seminal illustrations of realist logic comes from the Melian dialogue, as depicted in the classic work *History of the Peloponnesian War*, by Thucydides (c 460-400 BC). In this passage, Athenian negotiators threaten to invade the Melian's island of Melos unless tribute is paid. In response and understanding very well that tribute to Athens in effect meant joining the Athenians in their ongoing war with the Lacedaemonians (Lacedaemon was the area of ancient Greece that encompassed the city-state of Sparta), the Melians sought to maintain their neutrality. What ensues is a classic, and fascinating, discussion of ideals and power relationships between weak and strong states, which arguably echo future realist vs. liberal debates on the nature of international politics.

Watch the video:

The Melian Dialogue from *The War That Never Ends* (1991).
The Melian Dialogue from *The War That Never Ends* (1991).

Neorealism

Waltz published *The Theory of International Politics*, which suggested that classical realism suffered from a key deficiency, namely that it could not explain international relations at the systemic level. For Waltz, the operative question is not, "What goal is this or that state pursuing?" but rather, "How many dominant great powers are there in the system?" In other words, the key issue for Waltz's framework is whether the world is multipolar, bipolar, or unipolar. Waltz argued that a bipolar system, as experienced during the Cold War, is the most prone to **relative peace**, while multipolarity, as in pre-WWI Europe, is the most prone to conflict. Making the case for focusing on the system itself over the actions of individual states within the system, Waltz writes

Structural Realism (2014) ⏱ 10 MINUTES

Even when structures do not change, they are dynamic, not static, in that they alter the behavior of actors and affect the outcome of their interactions. Given a durable structure, it becomes easy to overlook structural effects because they are repeatedly the same. Thus one expects the same broad range of outcomes to result from the actions of states in an anarchic condition. What continues and repeats is surely not less important than what changes. A constancy of structure explains the recurrent patterns and features of international political life. Is structure nevertheless an empty concept? Pretty much so, and because it is it gains in elegance and power. Structure is certainly no good on detail. Structural concepts, although they lack detailed content, help to explain some big, important, and enduring patterns.

Unipolarity or Multipolarity?

In 1999 the political scientist William Wohlforth commented: "The United States enjoys a much larger margin of superiority over the next most powerful state or, indeed, all other great powers combined than any leading state in the last two centuries." (William C. Wohlforth, The Stability of a Unipolar World, *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 1, p. 5) A decade later – even as the expeditionary forces of the United States and its allies were struggling in the deserts of Iraq and the mountains of Afghanistan – the case for unipolarity appeared no less persuasive to informed commentators. They continued to point to the fact that the United States enjoyed a huge margin of military superiority over its allies and its adversaries alike. The Royal United Services Institute claimed: "The US is more than a superpower, it is more correctly termed a hyperpower." (RUSI, *The Future Security Environment*, 2008, p. 3) Today, observers are divided on the question of whether the unipolar moment is over. On the one hand, the hasty exit from Afghanistan seemed to suggest that American power is waning and the world is rapidly transitioning to a multipolar system. On the other hand, some commentators point out that the optics of US decline are always magnified by the media, and both China and Russia will have to overcome some very significant obstacles of their own if they are going to challenge US supremacy.

To Learn More

Afghan Exit Buries the Unipolar Moment (2021)

To Learn More

Out of Afghanistan: A Realist View (2021)

LIBERALISM

The Intellectual Heritage of Liberalism

In this course, liberalism refers to the school of International Relations theory rather than the philosophy of any political party in the United States or elsewhere. It is important to note that in IR theory the term "liberal", like the terms "realist" and "constructivist", do not carry any pejorative connotation.

Liberalism was a product of the Enlightenment, which was a Western intellectual movement that held sway in the late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The writings of the English philosopher John Locke (1632-1704) laid important foundations of liberal thought. Locke articulated his political philosophy in *Two Treatises on Government* (1690), in which he rejected the hereditary principle and absolute monarchy. Locke argued that: natural rights (life, liberty, and ownership of property) are antecedent to the claims of the state, and must be respected; government is only legitimate if it is based on consent; and representative institutions must be interposed between the people and the government. These ideas eventually found their most famous expression in the American Revolution and the Declaration of Independence (1776).

Building from this foundation, liberals have contended that the freedom and welfare of citizens is contingent not only on the domestic political arrangements of the state, but also on its foreign policies, and the extent of cooperation in the international states system. Liberals are suspicious of militarism not only because it can lead to war with other states, and the oppression of peoples in occupied territories, but also because governments have often suspended civil liberties during wartime, and used the apparatus of military power to oppress their own citizens.

Key Tenets of Liberalism

Liberalism and realism are often represented as polar opposites. In fact, there is some common ground between these two schools of thought: they are both positivist (they accept the existence of observable and verifiable phenomena); they both accept that the international states system is anarchic (because there is no world government); they both recognize the importance of states as the most important actors in international relations; and they both accept the notion of rational decision-making in international politics.

Theory in Action: Liberalism ⏱ 6 MINUTES

However, there are notable differences between liberalism and realism. First, although both recognize the importance of the state, liberals also tend to highlight the significance of the roles played in international politics by other actors. These include prominent individuals (for example, Elon Musk, who in February 2022 supplied "Starlink" satellite internet service to Ukraine during the opening phases of the Russian invasion); intergovernmental organizations (such as the United Nations and European Union, which were established by international treaties); international nongovernmental organizations, which include thousands of civil society groups involved in international aid and development (like the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development) and philanthropic organizations (like the Ford, Gates, and Rockefeller Foundations); and a multitude of economic actors (financial institutions and transnational corporations).

Economic Interdependence	Economic interdependence can be achieved through trade, multinational corporations, and resource sharing. By engaging in mutually beneficial commercial interactions, liberals believe states can become dependent on one another to the point that they seek to avoid conflict. Further, while liberals acknowledge that there is widespread inequality in the world, they also suggest that this can be ameliorated by a commitment to free trade, which will progressively lead to a reduction in global poverty. This is encapsulated in the aphorism "a rising tide raises all boats." For a counter-argument see Orelus and Chomsky (2014).
International Institutions	
Collective Security	
Democratic Peace Theory	

Trade: Absolute vs. Relative Gains

Liberals and realists disagree over the extent to which international cooperation is possible. One of the key areas of disagreement is about the effects of trade, which can be illustrated by the debate over the entrance of China into the global economic system in the late 1990s. The United States granted the People's Republic of China Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status, which then set the stage for the PRC to join the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Absolute and Relative Gains (2020) ⏱ 5 MINUTES

At the heart of this debate is the question of whether relative gains or absolute gains are more important. Neorealists insist that states are more concerned by relative gains (improvements in a state's position relative to other states), whereas neoliberals argue that states are more motivated by the prospect of absolute gains (improvements in a state's position in absolute terms). In retrospect it is clear that anxiety about the PRC's relative gains was well founded, because its spectacular economic growth and dominant position in international trade laid the foundations for the PRC to become the primary strategic threat to the United States. This is examined further in Lesson 3.

Neoliberal Institutionalism

As suggested above, despite the differences between realism and liberalism, it is important not to view them as inherently antithetical to one another. Neoliberal institutionalism seeks to combine the logic of realism and liberalism. In *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (1977) Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye articulated the theory of "complex interdependence", which acknowledged the trend towards international cooperation, especially through international organizations. They argued that states cooperate through international institutions because it is in their rational self-interest to do so. That is, by ceding some sovereign control to international institutions, states can mitigate some of the effects of the anarchic world system, generating greater stability and lessening the likelihood of conflict. This is a proposition that realists can support without having to buy into the more ideological arguments in favor of international institutions.

To Learn More

A Marxist Argument against Liberalism (2014)

To Learn More

Kant in the Age of Thucydides (2021)

To Learn More

What Went Wrong in Afghanistan (2021)

Power transition theory

Power transition theory (PTT) is in many ways an inversion of classical realism's balance of power prescription. First introduced by A. F. K. Organski in his 1958 book *World Politics*, power transition theory makes the case that an imbalance of power, rather than balance, holds the key to relative peace. If there is no question about who is the most powerful state in the world—the so-called "global power," or "hegemon"— no other state will dare challenge that dominance, and there will be no costly wars between the global power and a challenger.

Organski divides great powers into **status quo powers** (meaning, those that support the current order, under the current global power), and **revisionist powers**, who are unhappy with the status quo. According to Organski, revisionist powers that are effective in challenging the global power must themselves have a large population, industrial strength, and strong political organization capable of mobilizing popular support. For example, Organski had the foresight to see the rise of China: "Given the huge Chinese population, the power of China ought eventually to become greater than that of the Soviet Union simply through internal development. If China is successful … the Western powers will find that the most serious threat to their supremacy comes from China" (Organski, 361).

Hegemon: What's in a Name?

Hegemony means the ability to exercise total control over a domain. To call the United States a world **hegemon** is therefore technically incorrect, and also offensive to our allies. It is incorrect in the strictest sense because, despite some of the literature in international relations that uses the term, hegemony implies absolute control. Therefore, if the United States were a "hegemon," that would not imply America leads among allies; it would imply the United States can order everyone else around, including its friends. That is simply not the case, nor the intention of the United States. To learn more about America's current position in the world, read David Wilkinson's 1999 article, "Unipolarity without Hegemony".

Credit: The GCPME, based on Bueno de Mesquita

Credit: The GCPME, based on Flint

INTERACTIONS AMONG GREAT POWERS

In the previous sections, we discussed theories that seek to explain the causes of war between great powers. These theoretical approaches assume some conscious effort on the part of states to either engage in or avoid conflict. While these holistic theories are informative, they tell us little about the day-to-day interactions among states. This portion of the lesson delves into the nature of such daily interactions.

This section begins with the most common type of interaction—trade—, and how it can lead to escalating tensions when interests do not align. It then describes various theoretical constructs that political scientists warn can lead rational policymakers to make self-defeating decisions in their interactions with other states.

Currencies and Trade

The realm of international trade frequently provides examples of how rational behavior can lead to unproductive, even dangerous outcomes on a global scale. While the most common types of interactions between states play out as financial and commercial exchanges, even in these areas conflict can arise. The manipulation of currencies and trade wars can both escalate tensions between states.

The value of a currency determines a state's ability to buy and sell goods in the global marketplace. Most currencies of the world have a floating exchange rate, meaning their value fluctuates in response to ever changing supply and demand: the more people buy a currency, the higher its value becomes. Thus, some states see benefits to having an undervalued currency. That is, if one state has a currency that is cheaper than others, the goods that state produces become more competitively priced in the global marketplace. If goods are competitively priced, more global customers will buy those cheap goods, and that state will subsequently gain a greater share of the market.

Trump's Trade War (2019) ⏱30 MINUTES

Trade, which is inherently connected with currency exchange, comes with winners and losers. If a country's manufacturing sector suffers due to competition from a cheaper market, internal political conflict can ensue. Sometimes, states impose tariffs on imported goods to make foreign products less competitive in the domestic market. Their aim is to force domestic consumers to purchase goods that were produced at home. While the effects can vary, one thing is certain: when one state places tariffs on another state's goods, retaliation can ensue, and escalation is possible.

The Prisoner's Dilemma (2014) ⏱6 MINUTES

The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (2016) ⏱10 MINUTES

The Prisoner's Dilemma in World War I

One example of the prisoner's dilemma in strategic competition is the outbreak of World War I. Arguably, one of the important forces driving these historic great powers to war was the offensive dominant environment in which they were interacting. That is, in the event of a war, the state that attacked first would have the upper hand. Germany, stuck between France and Russia, had devised a plan to avoid having to fight a two-front war (this is the so-called Schlieffen Plan). In this plan, Germany would have to respond quickly to Russia's mobilization of troops. If the Russians advanced, Germany would invade France, via Belgium, aim for a quick victory, and swing back east to confront Russia with the bulk of its forces. The problem? The plan relied on "jumping the gun." For the German General Staff's plan to work, Germany had to mobilize quickly at the first sight of Russian advance. Russia decided to institute only a partial mobilization of troops on July 25, and Germany responded by issuing a declaration of war on August 1, and invading Belgium on August 3. Germany felt it had to attack quickly, lest it be left having to fight against an already advanced Russia and France simultaneously.

The Security Dilemma

Another way that rational actors can get themselves in trouble is through the **security dilemma**. In the security dilemma, actions that a state takes to increase its security may cause other states to feel threatened. If a state builds up its military to feel more secure, that state's neighbors may read those actions as a direct challenge. The security dilemma is exacerbated by the frequently vague or nonexistent difference between offensive and defensive weaponry. Save for a few systems, such as anti-aircraft systems, most modern weapons can be used in both an offensive and defensive manner. Those who feel threatened by a state's sudden increase in armaments cannot afford to assume good intentions. They must be prepared for the worst-case scenario. Thus, they may be tempted to escalate in kind.

Credit: GCPME, adapted from Daisy Thornton

A historical example of the security dilemma among great powers is the US-Soviet arms race. At their respective peaks, each superpower's arsenal of nuclear warheads **numbered in the tens of thousands**—well beyond the number required to add any obvious benefit to either side.

A more recent example of the security dilemma is the crisis that erupted following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This is the most serious conflict in Europe since the end of the Second World War. It raised fears that Russian territorial ambitions are not restricted to Ukraine, especially among the European states that are closest geographically to Russia. Accordingly, in April 2022, Sweden and Finland announced that they were actively considering an application to join NATO. Public statements that Sweden and Finland could be admitted to the alliance within a matter of weeks provoked Russia to warn that it was prepared to strengthen its defenses in the Baltic, including the deployment of nuclear weapons. This development could increase the possibility of a confrontation between NATO and Russia.

STRATEGIC COMPETITION

We have discussed how shifts in the global distribution of power may lead to conflict. We also explored how well-meaning rational actors can create dangerous situations that may lead to war. Yet, direct war between great powers remains exceedingly rare. As of 2020, over 27,000 days have passed since the end of the last great-power conflict, World War II. Strategic competition is ever-present, but great power war is mercifully uncommon.

Deterrence and Compellence

Why are great power wars rare? There are many reasons why states avoid war, but the most essential issue is cost. When the cost of war becomes clearly and unambiguously greater than any benefit, war becomes pointless. This cost of war is captured in the concept of deterrence.

United States military doctrine defines **deterrence** as something that "prevents an adversary's undesirable actions, because the adversary perceives an unacceptable risk or cost of acting" (Joint Publication 3-0 2017, v9). This definition is useful because it contains what are arguably the two most important elements to consider when discussing deterrence: prevention and perception.

At its core, deterrence is preventing someone from doing something they otherwise would do. Prevention is only possible if the aggressor is aware of the consequences of aggressing. That awareness comes from understanding the potential target's ability and commitment to react. The response, therefore, has to be both possible and probable.

The flipside of deterrence is what Nobel Prize-winning economist Thomas Schelling called **compellence**—the act of compelling someone else to do something they otherwise would not do.

Required Material ⏱40 MINUTES

2022 Nuclear Posture Review (2022)

NUCLEAR SECURITY ISSUES

As part of longstanding policy, the United States offers **extended deterrence** to key allies and friends. Extended deterrence refers to the practice of third parties providing deterrence support in a conflict or dispute. For example, the United States is not a direct party to the China-Taiwan dispute, but America has communicated an interest in standing in the way of any plans by China to invade Taiwan. The United States regularly sells arms to Taiwan, and in some occasions US leaders have made their commitment to Taiwan's security quite explicit. In 2001, **President George W. Bush said** that the United States would do "whatever it takes" to defend Taiwan.

Regional Nuclear Issues and the NPT

India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea all became nuclear weapons states outside the framework of the 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), either because they pulled out of the treaty (North Korea), or because they had never signed it (India, Israel, and Pakistan). Iran, which is a signatory of the NPT but has consistently violated its terms and its spirit, has pursued nuclear weapons capabilities.

The NPT, which the vast majority of states in the world have signed, is predicated on a simple bargain: except for officially acknowledged nuclear weapons states—the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, and France—, no state shall develop nuclear weapons. In return, nuclear weapons states agree to share peaceful nuclear technology with nonnuclear states. This bargain comes with some risk: peaceful nuclear technology and material can be diverted toward weapons manufacturing. In other words, if a state wants to eventually develop nuclear weapons, it could mask its military intentions while developing requisite nuclear energy capabilities out in the open.

The institution created to verify NPT compliance is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

ISS-602A – Making Decisions

MAKING DECISIONS: STRATEGY AND WAR

Lesson 1 - International Relations Schools in Practice

Click to Begin Lesson

Course Syllabus
GET STARTED

LESSON 1

LESSON 2

Course Wrap-Up

Recent Announcements

Final Friday
Team,   Congrats on nearing the end of the course, particula...
Posted on: Dec 13, 2024, 8:42 AM
↩ Reply

DQ2
Team,   Thanks to those that jumped into DQ2 already. This...
Posted on: Dec 11, 2024, 9:24 AM
↩ Reply

Monday Reset

Lesson 1 - International Relations Schools in Practice

IDE graduates may find themselves tasked to engage in complex or ill-defined problems with which they have little or no background knowledge. This lesson provides students with an opportunity to analyze U.S. interests in relation to a hypothetical conflict scenario in the South China Sea and to evaluate three schools of International Relations (IR) theory in connection with the crisis scenario.

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Realism

Liberalism

Constructivism

Conclusion

A Constructivist Approach to a Rising China (2021)

TO LEARN MORE

Sticks and Stones (2021)

MODERN WAR INSTITUTE

STICKS AND STONES: REALISM, CONSTRUCTIVISM, RHETORIC, AND GREAT POWER COMPETITION

Stanley Lim | 12.22.21

AIR COMMAND & STAFF COMMENTARY

A Constructivist Approach to a Rising China

Maj Benjamin C. Jamison, USAF

The rise of China in the twenty-first century marks the end of unipolarity. The United States must meet the challenge of a resurgent China while maintaining its own status in the international system. It is in the United States' best interest to pursue a strategy that avoids violence with China, while maintaining US hegemony in the western hemisphere and status as a superpower. To accomplish this, the United States has two imperative tasks: it must accept the end of unipolarity, and it must start using constitutive power to foster a rising China that behaves in accordance with internationally established norms. Alternatively, the sole option for the United States to maintain hegemony is an offensive realist strategy where the US competes with China across all domains. Pursuing this option would be a mistake. Given China's strong nationalism, rising economic power, and regional interests, an offensive realist strategy will exacerbate Chinese security concerns and likely lead to armed conflict. However, if the US can accept the peaceful rise of China and maintain its superpower status, there exists the potential for an agreeable bipolar, or multipolar world. This article uses a constructivist lens to explore existing strategic narratives about China and demonstrates how a hybrid grand strategy of cooperative security and selective engagement presents a path for a peaceful rise of China without compromising America's core interests in Asia, US regional hegemony, or the United States' status as a superpower.

Constructivism seeks to understand the establishment of norms in international relations.[1] Human societies construct appropriate behavior from the stories that they accept and propagate; ideas of power and influence emerge from these stories.[2] This social construct generates a common knowledge shared among people.[2] Common knowledge in the international arena, however, is not an egalitarian process. The more powerful states in the system have significant constitutive power; that is, they can shape, to a degree, international norms according to their own values.[3] Therefore, in the international political system, the more dominant states influence how states view themselves, how states view other states, and how states desire other states to view themselves. If a state views a rising power as a revisionist threat, and reacts with an offensive realist strategy, conflict is almost certain between the two states. Likewise, if states view other states as open to

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REALISM

Using your knowledge from ISS-601S Lesson 1, and the required and suggested readings in this lesson, consider the utility of realism for understanding the scenario in Discussion 1.

Points to consider include (but are not limited to): rational decision making; an emphasis on the state; state egoism (classical realism); the anarchic international system (neorealism); measuring state power; the security dilemma; alliances and the balance of power; and polarity.

REQUIRED MATERIAL

Preventing War in the South China Sea (2021)

LIBERALISM

Using your knowledge from ISS-601S Lesson 1, and the required and suggested readings in this lesson, consider the utility of liberalism for understanding the scenario in Discussion 1.

Points to consider include (but are not limited to): rational decision making; economic interdependence; absolute vs relative gains; international institutions; international law; democratic peace theory; and collective security.

REQUIRED MATERIAL

U.S. Grand Strategy Towards China (2021)

CONSTRUCTIVISM

Using your knowledge from ISS-601S Lesson 1, and the required and suggested readings in this lesson, consider the utility of constructivism for understanding the scenario in Discussion 1.

Points to consider include (but are not limited to): nonrational decision making; history, culture, and identity; rhetoric and construction of adversarial relationships; and the construction of norms in international relations.

REQUIRED MATERIAL

A Constructivist Approach to a Rising China (2021)

IDE graduates may find themselves tasked to recommend the use or non-use of force to solve international crises. This lesson focuses on the utility of the military instrument of power in the broader context of creating a strategy towards the PRC.

Lesson Objectives

In this lesson, students will:

1. Analyze the utility of the military instrument of power in the context of US strategy towards the Asia-Pacific region. (Analyzing)
2. Apply the ends-ways-means-risk model in the context of US strategy towards the Asia-Pacific region. (Applying)
3. Determine how the current strategic environment has been affected by information warfare. (Applying)
4. Apply the DIMEFIL framework in the context of US strategy towards the Asia-Pacific region. (Applying)

Lesson 2 - The Military Instrument

IDE graduates may find themselves tasked to recommend the use or non-use of force to solve international crises. This lesson focuses on the utility of the military instrument of power in the broader context of creating a strategy towards the PRC.

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Chinese Perspectives

American Policy

Conclusion

CHINESE PERSPECTIVES

In WAR-601S you learned that war is of a timeless nature but with an ever-evolving character. Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, Mao, and Sun Tzu all offered insights into how and why nations go to war and methods for the conduct of war. You will be familiar with Sun Tzu's instruction in *The Art of War*. ***"Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."***

Proceeding from that admonition, it is important to grasp how the current strategic environment has been affected by newer domain developments, and how the Chinese have responded to these. The videos below explain China's "Informationized Warfare," which may condition your thinking about strategy towards the PRC.

TO LEARN MORE

Informationized Warfare (2021) 70 MINUTES

Informationized Warfare (2021) 71 MINUTES

AMERICAN POLICY

The willingness of U.S. strategists and policy makers to use force in support of foreign policy objectives has changed over time, and it will continue to change as the United States faces new challenges. Every challenge forces the United States to reconsider its preferred approach.

It is critical that strategists and policy makers consider all the nation's available instruments of power (IOPs) when attempting to resolve a crisis, as military force may not be the appropriate tool. In today's globally connected environment, Diplomatic, Informational, and/or Economic instruments of power may often be more suitable than military force for achieving the desired end state.

The key to successful strategy and national policy is determining the right mix and timing of IOPs to effectively create synergistic results. Consider how this connects back to your study of the American Way of War.

Discussion 1 - The South China Sea Crisis Through an International Relations Lens

Week 1 Assignment

Initial post due by Thursday of Week 1 (2359 Central Time)

Response posts due by Sunday of Week 1 (2359 Central Time)

Purpose

The purpose of this discussion is to analyze a scenario in the South China Sea through the lens of three schools of International Relations (IR) theory (realism, liberalism, and constructivism). In doing so, you will strengthen your understanding of the utility of IR theory and develop your understanding of an important region of strategic competition.

Task

Submit an initial post of 600-to-700-words analyzing your instructor-assigned school of International Relations (IR). Justify and support your answer using the assigned course material and your professional experience where relevant.

Respond to at least two other initial posts in 200-to-250 words, analyzing the accuracy and completeness of those initial posts. You must respond to two IR schools that are different from your initial post. That means you will, at a minimum, write one post on each IR perspective.

SCENARIO:

In the Spratly Island grouping, 92 of approximately 150 land features have remained unoccupied—until now. In waters claimed by China, Vietnam, and the Philippines, six Chinese fishermen have just drowned after their vessel was sunk by the Vietnamese Coast Guard. China has responded by landing marines on some of the previously unoccupied features in the vicinity. Vietnam has reacted in kind, occupying six additional features. Taiwan and the Philippines not wanting to be left behind are planning to grab some new islets as well. All the claimants are suspicious of one another, but Sino-Vietnamese relations are particularly tense, and intelligence reports have estimated with high confidence that an armed clash is likely to occur within the next month.

QUESTION:

Explain the given scenario through the lens of an assigned school of International Relations.

NOTE:

For your three required posts you must use and cite selected readings in Lesson 1, International Relations Schools in Practice.

*While you MUST meet the required number of formal posts and responses to successfully complete the assignment, you are strongly encouraged to promote a sense of community by following-up comments with acknowledgements, clarifications, and other forms of collegial and professional engagement.

Criteria

Use the rubric below to prepare for and complete your assignment. It provides valuable information regarding the criteria your assignment will be evaluated against.

ISS-602A Discussion 1, The South China Sea Crisis Through an International Relations Lens

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Week 2 Assignment

Everyone   No Due Date   100 points possible

Discussion 2, The South China Sea Crisis: An American Response

Initial post due by Thursday of Week 2 (2359 Central Time)

Response posts due by Sunday of Week 2 (2359 Central Time)

Purpose

This discussion is designed to help you better apply military theory to a present-day scenario. In doing so you will better be able to build off of your knowledge of military theory as well as your growing knowledge of how that applies in the current day. You are also carrying forward the scenario used in Lesson 1, Discussion 1 to better understand the material.

Task

Submit an initial post of approximately 200-250 words, then respond in 150-200 words to two other initial posts.

For your initial post, submit one paragraph (including references) that discusses:

SCENARIO

In the Spratly Island grouping, 92 of approximately 150 land features have remained unoccupied -- until now. In waters claimed by the PRC, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Philippines, six Chinese fishermen have just drowned after their vessel was sunk by the Vietnamese Coast Guard. The PRC has responded by landing marines on some of the previously unoccupied features in the vicinity. Vietnam has reacted in kind, occupying six additional features. Taiwan and the Philippines do not want to be left behind and are planning to grab some new islets as well. All the claimants are suspicious of one another, but Sino-Vietnamese relations are particularly tense, and intelligence reports have estimated with high confidence that an armed clash is likely to occur within the next month.

QUESTION

Referring to at least 1 military theorist, develop an American response to the scenario.

For your two response posts consider how differing military theorists might attempt to address the security concerns and military situation in the given scenario.

Criteria

Use the rubric below to prepare for and complete your assignment. It provides valuable information regarding the criteria your assignment will be evaluated against.

ISS-602A Discussion 2, The South China Sea Crisis: An American Response

The rubric provides valuable information regarding the criteria the assignment will be evaluated against

Final Essay - Adversarial Essay

✓ Published

Due by Sunday of Week 2 (2359 Central Time)

NOTE: *This is a two-week assignment.*

Purpose

This essay draws upon all that you have learned in ISS-601S, WAR-601S, and this course as well as your greater knowledge of the application of that material to a real-world scenario. You will place yourself in the role of a US adversary and, in that role, reference one military theorist and a (different) IR theory than you represented in the Week One Discussion.

Task

Write an essay of 1600 words to answer the following prompt:

PROMPT: Using Ends, Ways, and Means, develop a People's Republic of China strategy for the South China Sea with reference to at least one military theorist and a different school of IR from the one assigned in your week one discussion.

Criteria

Use the rubric below to prepare for and complete your assignment. It provides valuable information regarding the criteria your assignment will be evaluated against.

ISS-602A Final Essay, Adversarial Essay ↓

Outcomes-Based Rubric	with Criterion and Element General Descriptions		ISS-602A Final Essay, Adversarial Essay (Summative Analytic - 09/20/2024)			220 pts
Criterion	**Long Description**		**Ratings**			
Points per Row		20	16	12	8	0
Critical Thinking Skills (Inference)	Evaluates the ability to logically draw generalizations, implications, or consequences based on presented evidence and assumptions. #ACSC #SLO1.1 #Summative	Consistently draws logical and coherent generalizations, implications, or consequences from presented evidence and assumptions.	Frequently draws logical generalizations, implications, or consequences from presented evidence and assumptions.	Occasionally draws logical generalizations, implications, or consequences from presented evidence and assumptions.	Rarely or never draws logical generalizations, implications, or consequences from presented evidence and assumptions.	Did Not Attempt
Points per Row		10	8	6	4	0
Effective Writing Skills (Clarity and Coherence)	Evaluates the clarity and coherence of written products. #ACSC #SLO1.4 #Summative	Writing is well structured, cohesive, and articulate.	Writing is mostly well structured, cohesive, and articulate.	Writing is somewhat well structured, cohesive, and articulate.	Writing is not well structured, cohesive, and articulate.	Did Not Attempt
Effective Writing Skills (Writing Mechanics)	Measures the adherence of written products to accepted academic mechanical and grammatical standards. #ACSC #SLO1.4 #Summative	Very few errors in grammar, spelling, and or punctuation.	Few errors in grammar, spelling, and/or punctuation.	Some errors in grammar, spelling, and/or punctuation.	Many errors in grammar, spelling, and/or punctuation.	Did Not Attempt
Points per Row		10	8	6	4	0
Essay (Introduction)	Assesses the effectiveness of the introduction in presenting the thesis or primary topic and setting the stage for the essay's organizational flow. #ACSC #SLO1.4 #Summative	Thesis/primary topic and organizational flow are clear.	Thesis/primary topic or organizational flow are unclear.	Thesis/primary topic and organizational flow are unclear.	Thesis/primary topic and/or organizational flow are missing.	Did Not Attempt
Essay (Body)	Assesses coherence and clarity of each paragraph, assessing a clear main point, supporting evidence, and effective transitions between ideas. #ACSC #SLO1.4 #Summative	Each paragraph has a clear main point, supporting evidence, and effective transitions.	Most paragraphs have a clear main point, supporting evidence, and effective transitions.	Some paragraphs have a clear main point, supporting evidence, and effective transitions.	Few or no paragraphs have a clear main point, supporting evidence, and effective transitions.	Did Not Attempt
Essay (Conclusion)	Assesses the effectiveness of the conclusion in restating the thesis, summarizing main points, and reinforcing the essay's overall theme. #ACSC #SLO1.4 #Summative	Clearly restates thesis/primary topic, summarizes main points, and solidly reinforces the main theme.	Somewhat restates thesis/primary topic, summarizes main points, and partially reinforces the main theme.	Vaguely restates thesis/primary topic and summarizes main points, and insufficiently reinforces the main theme.	Does not restate thesis/primary topic, summarize main points, or fails to reinforces the main theme.	Did Not Attempt
Essay (Style)	Assesses the clarity, coherence, and conciseness of language used to express ideas. #ACSC #SLO1.4 #Summative	Expresses all ideas in a clear, coherent, concise manner, using suitable language.	Expresses most ideas in a clear coherent, concise manner, using mostly suitable language.	Expresses some ideas in a clear coherent, concise manner, using some suitable language.	Expresses few ideas in a clear, coherent, concise manner, using little suitable language.	Did Not Attempt
Points per Row		25	20	15	10	0
Applying - Part 1 (Identify)	Assesses the ability to recognize and list relevant knowledge and skills for application in new situations. #ACSC #SLO3.2 #PRC6.1#Summative	Selects and accurately describes highly relevant aspects of an adversarial power's posture toward the given security crisis.	Selects and adequately describes some relevant aspects of an adversarial power's posture toward the given security crisis.	Selects and partially describes at least one relevant aspect of an adversarial power's posture toward the given security crisis.	Selects but poorly or inadequately describes an adversarial power's posture toward the given security crisis.	Did Not Attempt
Applying - Part 1 (Transfer)	Assesses the extent of appropriate application of learned knowledge and skills in new or different contexts. #ACSC #SLO3.2 #PRC6.1#Summative	Adequately and credibly describes both a military theorist and IR theory different from their assigned theory in week one discussion.	Moderately describes both a military theorist and IR theory different from their assigned theory in week one discussion.	Partially describes a military theorist and IR theory different from their assigned theory in week one discussion.	Fails to describe both a military theorist and IR theory different from their assigned theory in week one discussion.	Did Not Attempt
Points per Row		25	20	15	10	0
Applying - Part 2 (Identify)	Assesses the ability to recognize and list relevant knowledge and skills for application in new situations. #ACSC #SLO3.3 #PRC6.2#Summative	1. Describes most relevant challenges in the current security environment.	1. Describes some relevant challenges in the current security environment.	1. Describes few relevant challenges in the current security environment.	1. Fails to describe any relevant challenges in the current security environment.	Did Not Attempt
Applying - Part 2 (Transfer)	Assesses the extent of appropriate application of learned knowledge and skills in new or different contexts. #ACSC #SLO3.3 #PRC6.2#Summative	Effectively uses Lykke model to inform an approach to the given crisis from an adversarial power's position.	Mostly effectively uses Lykke model to inform an approach to the given crisis from an adversarial power's position.	Somewhat effectively uses Lykke model to inform an approach to the given crisis from an adversarial power's position.	Fails to use the Lykke model to inform an approach to the given crisis from an adversarial power's position.	Did Not Attempt